

Message Text

PAGE 01 CAIRO 05223 01 OF 02 201026Z

20

ACTION H-03

INFO OCT-01 NEA-07 ISO-00 SS-07 NSC-06 AID-01 /025 W

----- 012412

R 190903Z APR 76

FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2164

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 CAIRO 5223

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OREP (JAVITS, JACOB)

SUBJ: CODEL JAVITS: MEMCON--PRESIDENT SADAT/SENATOR JAVITS

SUMMARY: SENATOR JAVITS HAD WIDE RANGING CORDIAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH SADAT. SADAT SUGGESTED STATE OF BELLIGERENCY BE ENDED OFFICIALLY WITH GURANTEES FOR BOTH SIDES AND ESTABLISHMENT OF PALESTINIAN STATE. SENATOR WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN TIMING OF PEACE PROCESS WHICH HE BELIEVED SHOULD GETTSENDR WAY AGIN IMMEDIATELY. THE PRESIDENT SAID HE WANTS TO CONVENE MEPC IN 1976, TO ESTABLISH FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATION, ASK PLO TO JOIN IN , THEN, AFTER US ELECTIONS, BUILD IN GENEVA ON FRAMEWORK OF GLOBAL APPROACH. LIVELY EXCHANGE ON "MODERATION" OF FATAH ENDED IN SENATOR'S EXPRESSING UNDERSTANDING THAT SOME FORMULA FOR PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION MUST BE FOUND. SENATOR STATED HIS OPPOSITION TO PERMITTING PLO, TERRORIST ORGANIZATION WHICH HAS MANDATE FROM NO ONE, TO REPRESENT PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. HE IS TOTALLY OPPOSED TO FORMAL USG/PLO DIALOGUE. ARAFAT, HE BELIEVES, IS NOT A "MODERATE". ASKED WHY HE HAD ABROGATED SOVIET TREATY, SADAT EXPLAINED SOVIETS WISH AREA TURMOIL TO CONTINUE SO THAT EGYPT WILL BE PER-ENNIALY BEHOLDEN TO THEM, AND EXPLANATION WHICH DEEPLY IMPRESSED THE SENATOR. FOLLOWING MEMCON HAS BEEN CLEARED BY SENATOR WHO HAS COPY WITH HIM. END SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT SADAT RECEIVED SENATOR JAVITS APRIL 17 IN GIZA FOR AN HOUR AND 15 MINUTES. VP HUSNI MUBARAK WAS PRESENT, AS SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 05223 01 OF 02 201026Z

WAS AMBASSADOR EILTS AND THE SENATOR'S STAFF AIDES MR. KELLERMANN AND MR. LAKELAND.

2. SENATOR JAVITS RECALLED HE HAD JUST TOLD MINPET HILAL

THAT THE FREE AND OPEN DEBATE IN THE SENATE IS SOMETIMES MISUNDERSTOOD ABROAD AND THAT HE HOPED FOREIGN OBSERVERS WOULD NOT BE UNDULY DISMAYED BY THE SOMETIMES SPIRITED INTERNAL CONGRESSIONAL DISCUSSIONS.

3. US, EUROPE AND MIDDLE EAST.

PRESIDENT NOTED THAT SENATOR HAD COME TO EGYPT AT CRITICAL TIME, ADDING THAT HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM EUROPE WHERE HE FOUND MANY OF AMERICA'S FRIENDS, PARTICULARLY THE WEST GERMANS, CONCERNED ABOUT SOVIET BUILD UP IN AFRICA. SENATOR ASKED IF SADAT HAD SENSED A EUROPEAN BELIEF THAT US HAS LOST ITS SENSE OF RESOLUTION, TO WHICH PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT THIS WAS TRUE. SENATOR RECALLED HIS WORK IN COMMITTEE OF NINE ON THIS SUBJECT AND EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT NATO AFFAIRS HAVE DIRECT BEARING ON ME.

4. THE SENATOR SAID EUROPE HAD NOT JOINED US IN ME EFFORTS. HE WONDERED IF THIS EUROPEAN "IMMOBILISME" WAS DUE TO FEAR AND OR IRRESOLUTION. PRESIDENT THOUGH EUROPEANS ARE READY TO LIVE UP TO THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AS ELEMENTS SUPPORTING US POLICY, BUT THAT THEY KNOW ONLY US CAN INFLUENCE ISRAEL AND THEREFORE US HAS PRIME RESPONSIBILITY IN ME. SENATOR THOUGHT EUROPE DOES HAVE ROLE, RECALLING UK'S DRAFTING OF RES. 242.

5. MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT FORD.

SENATOR, NOTED HE HAD SEEN PRESIDENT FORD APRIL 14, SAID PRESIDENT HAD ASKED HIM TO CONVEY TO SADAT HIS RESPECTS AND REGARDS. HE HAD ASKED THE SENATOR TO EXPRESS HIS GRATITUDE AND APPRECIATION AT EGYPTIAN RESTRAINT IN LEBANON, ESPECIALLY SINCE " WE KNOW EGYPTIAN VIEWS DIFFER FROM THOSE OF SOME OTHERS".

6. TIMING FOR PEACE.

SENATOR NOTED HE HAD COME TO LISTEN AND LEARN AND HOPED HE COULD ONE DAY REPEAT HIS AIR TRIP OF 30 YEARS AGO FROM CAIRO TO TEL AVIV. NOTING THAT EGYPT AND ISRAEL HAVE ROUGHLY THREE-YEAR SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 05223 01 OF 02 201026Z

AGREEMENT, THAT SYRIA MUST MAKE UNDOF DECISION AT END OF MAY, THAT LEBANON IS IN FLAMES, AND THAT US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ARE IMMINENT, SENATOR ASKED IF NOW IS TIME TO MOVE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD. HE ADDED THAT CONVENTIONAL WISDOM WOULD ASSERT WE SHOULD WAIT UNTIL AFTER ELECTIONS AND AFTER PACIFICATION OF LEBANON. PRESIDENT SADAT RESPONDED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH PRESIDENT FORD IN SALZBURG TWO OPTIONS: (1) GLOBAL SETTLEMENT, OR, (2) ANOTHER STEP IN SINAI AND IN GOLAN AND THEN GLOBAL EFFORT AFTER US ELECTIONS. BOTH PARTIES HAD CONCLUDED IT MORE PRACTICAL GO FOR SECOND OPTION. HOWEVER, IN MARCH 1975, SINAI II FAILED BECAUSE ISRAEL WAS NOT READY AND HER GOVERNMENT WAS WEAK. NEVERTHELESS, PRESIDENT CONTINUED, EGYPT HAD OPENED CANAL AND RETURNED

REFUGEES TO CANAL ZONE THOUGH STILL WITHIN RANGE OF ISRAELI GUNS:
"I TOOK A RISK FOR PEACE".

7. AFTER COMPLETION SINAI II IN SEPTEMBER, COLAN STEP TURNED OUT TO BE IMPOSSIBLE, PRESIDENT SAID. FOR PARTY (I.E BA'ATH PARTY) REASONS, AUCTIONEERING, AND ASAD'S INABILITY TO CONTROL HIS PARTY, GOLAN II DID NOT COME ABOUT. FURTHER, USSR TOOK VERY BADLY SADAT'S AGREEMENT (IN SINAI II) TO PRESENCE OF US TECHNICIANS IN SINAI AS "WITNESSES".

PRESIDENT ADKED RHETORICALLY IF ISRAEL IS READY FOR PEACE. "MY EXPERIENCE TELLS ME" THAT ISRAEL IS NOT. NOT ONLY IS GOVERNMENT WEAK, BUT ISRAEL LACK LEADER WHO CAN FACE UP TO PEOPLE AND TO KNESSET. MRS. MIER WAS BETTER NEGOTIATING PARTNER AS WHEN CONVINCED SHE WAS RIGHT WOULD TAKE ON KNESSET.

8. FOR THESE REASONS, PRESIDENT COTINUED, HIS IDEA IS TO CONVENE GENEVA CONFERENCE IN 1976 " WE WILL ASK THE PLO TO JOIN US". IN GENEVA " WE WOULD WORK ON FRAMEWORK OF GLOBAL APPROACH AND THEN AFTER US ELECTIONS CONTINUE " (I.E GET SERIOUSLY DOWN TO WORK).

9. SENATOR REMARKED THAT GENEVA IMPOSSIBLE IF BOTH ISRAEL AND PLA ABSENT. DEADLOCK ARISES FROM MUTUAL BELIEF THAT PLO RIGHTS SHOULD NOT BE PREJUDICED VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL AND ISRAELI RIGHTS NOT BE PREJUDICED VIS-A-VIS PLO. IF PLO IS BROUGHT IN FROM THE OUTSET, NEITHER ISRAEL NOR PLO WILL SETTLE. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT NO ONE'S POSITION BE HARDNED, SENATOR ADDED HE HAD DEVOTED FOUR MONTHS TO GETTING SENAI II PASSED AND THAT DISCLOSURES WHICH WERE MADE HAD
SECRET

PAGE 04 CAIRO 05223 01 OF 02 201026Z

LED TO SOUL SEARCHING ON THE PART OF MANY.

10. PLO AND PEACE.
SENATOR REMARKED THAT FOR 25 YEARS PALESTINIANS HAD NOT BEEN AN ACTIVE ISSUE, BUT SIMPLY REFUGEES. ONLY IN LAST TWO YEARS HAD ANY ARAB STATE TAKEN MUCH NOTICE. BUT EMERGENCE PALESTINIAN ISSUE IS "IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT", A KEY ISSUE, SINCE 1947 PARTITION HAS AGAIN BEEN UNDONE. ANOTHER NEW FACTOR IS THAT ISRAELI HAD GUTS TO HOLD ELECTIONS, THOUGH THEY KNEW UNFRIENDLY CANDIDATES MIGHT WIN. NOW THERE ARE ELECTED OFFICIALS WHO CAN SPEAK FOR PALESTINIANS.

11. SENATOR NOTED THEREARE TWO REASONS FOR WHAT HE FELT IS GENERAL ANTI-PLO VIEWS OF THE CONGRESS: (A) RECKLESS TERRORISM, INVOLVING UNCESSARY CRUELTY, WHICH IS NIHILISTIC AND SERVES NO POLICY ENDS; (B) PLO HAS MANDATE FROM NO ONE AND IS NOT EVEN "IN THE COUNTRY". FURTHER , WHAT WOULD PLO DO WITH TINY STATE WHICH WOULD BE ECONOMICALLY WEAK AND PERHAPS BE SERIOUS THREAT TO ISRAEL. SENATOR EMPHASIZED HE WAS DESCRIBING CONGRESSIONAL OPINION AND NOT CONVEYING USG IDEAS.

SECRET

PAGE 01 CAIRO 05223 02 OF 02 191147Z

11

ACTION H-03

INFO OCT-01 NEA-07 ISO-00 SS-07 NSC-06 AID-01 /025 W

----- 002153

R 190903Z APR 76

FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2165

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 CAIRO 5223

12. PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT WE MUST CONSIDER PALESTINIANS AS A FACT OF LIFE. ON TERRORISM, HE NOTED FATAH (ARAFAT) COMMANDS ALLEGIANCE 80 PERCENT OF PLA AND THAT FATAH IS MODERATE. MUNICH WAS PERPETRATED BY OTHER 20 PERCENT. TERRORISM, HE CONTINUED, IS NATURAL OUTCOME OF SUCH POLITICAL MOVEMENTS. LORD MOYNE AND BERNADOTTE HAD BEEN KILLED; DEIR YASIN HAD OCCURRED. IT IS NOT FAIR" TO LOOK ONLY AT THIS ASPECT. PLO "HAS NOTHING" AND WE SHOULD NOT ASK PLO TO BE FIRST TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL. PRESIDENT NOTED HE TOO HAS PUBLICLY DENOUNCED TERRORISM BUT FRANKLY WONDERED IF HE WERE DISPLACED PALESTINIAN WHAT HE WOULD DO. HE HAD HIMSELF FOUGHT THE BRITISH AND SOUGHTFULL INDEPENDENCE FROM ROMMEL. FURTHER, WITH LEBANESE FLAIR UP, SITUATION EVEN MORE GRAVE SINCE SYRIA AND SOME OTHERS WANT EXTREMISTS TO TAKE OVER PLO. SOVIETS WANT THIS AND INCITED SYRIANS AGAINST EGYPT BECAUSE EGYPT ACCEPTED US PRESENCE IN SINAI.

13. IN SHORT, PRESIDENT BELIEVED WEST BANK-GAZA STATE WITH CORRIDOR WOULD BE "FAIR" AND NOT CONSTITUTE THREAT TO ISRAEL. SENATOR ASKED, WHY SUCH PALESTINIAN STATE WOULD NOT BE THREAT TO ISRAEL. PRESIDENT SAID NO STATE AROUND ISRAEL IS THREAT; "ISRAEL IS THREAT TO US." SITUATION CANNOT BE SETTLED BY POWERS OF ARMS; ISRAELIS IN 1967 TOOK GOLAN AND SUEZ BUT COULD NOT IMPOSE THEIR CONDITIONS, JUST AS EGYPT KNOCKED OUT 400 ISRAELI TANKS IN 1973 BUT FAILED TO IMPOSE CONDITIONS.

ONLY POSSIBLE APPROACH IS TO SIT TOGETHER. THIS CANNOT BE DONE WITHOUT PRESENCE OF PALESTINIANS, WHO, AS SENATOR HAD NOTED, REPRESENT CORE OF PROBLEM.

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 05223 02 OF 02 191147Z

14. SENATOR ASKED IF SADAT'S VIEW IS THAT IT IS SINE QUA NON TO FIND SOME FORMULA FOR PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION. SADAT AGREED.

15. ARAFAT A MODERATE?

PRESIDENT RECALLED HE HAD URGED PRESIDENT FORD AND SECRETARY

KISSINGER TO START A DIALOGUE WITH PLO SO THAT MODERATE REMAIN IN CONTROL. SENATOR ASKED WHAT MAKES ARAFAT A MODERATE, AND PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT "SAD TO CONFESS" TWO-FACEDNESS IS NOT UNCOMMON IN ARAB WORLD. WHEN ARAFAT TALKS TO SADAT, HE SAYS HE WILL ACCEPT RES. 242 AND ACCEPT WEST BANK-GAZA STATE. AT SAME TIME, HOWEVER, EXTREMISTS MINORITY IN PLO REQUIRES HIM TO SAY OTHERWISE IN PUBLIC.

16. SADAT ASKED WHY NOT GIVE ARAFAT A CHANCE. LET PLO COME AND SIT WITH US IN GENEVA AND DEMONSTRATE THERE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE MODERATE. SENATOR JAVITS THOUGHT IT "HARDLY A CREDIBLE INTERNATIONAL POSITION" TO SAY ARAFAT CLAIMS MODERATION WHEN TALKING PRIVATELY TO SADAT BUT SPEAKS OTHERWISE IN PUBLIC. SENATOR NOTED THAT ARAFAT HAS SAID HE WILL NEVER RECOGNIZE ISREAL AS STATE AND HAS BRANDISHED BOTH OLIVE BRANCH AND GUN AT UNGA. HE RECALLED MANY GOVERNMENTS HAD URGED US TO STAY IN VIET NAM IN PRIVATE WHILE PUBLICLY DENOUNCING OUR POLICY. SENATOR CONCLUDED THAT HE "WILL TRY TO SEE IF THERE IS A WAY", THOUGH PROBLEM IS COMPLEX IN ITSELF AND IN CONTEXT OF CONGRESS. SENATOR THOUGHT MOST OF THE CONGRESS WOULD BELIEVE THAT FOR ISRAEL TO ACCEPT PLO AS THE ENTITY TO ESTABLISH STATE NEXT DOOR WOULD REPRESENT ABSOLUTE AND FINAL SURRENDER. PRESIDENT AND SENATOR AGREED IT IS IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST TO WORK TOGETHER ON THIS PROBLEM.

17. FATH AND SA'QA.
ADDUCING ANOTHER EXAMPLE, PRESIDENT NOTED ARAFAT NOW FINDING SYRIA AND JORDAN ARE CONSPIRING AGAINST HIM; RESULT IS AN UNDELCARED RIFT. HE SAID ARAFAT HAD SENT HIM URGENT MESSAGE IN VIENNA ANNOUNCING THIS RIFT AND ASKING FOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY HELP AGAINST SYRIA. EGYPTIAN NEWS AGENCY HAD SIMPLY ANNOUNCED PRESIDENT HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM ARAFAT; PALESTINIAN NEWS AGENCY IMMEDIATELY DENIED STORY. FURTHER, PRESIDENT CONTINUED, SYRIA IS HOLDING PLO BY THE NECK AS IT CAN ELIMINATE PALESTINIANS FROM LEBANON ONCE AGAIN. PRESIDENT SAID HE ASKS FOR USG-PLO DIALOGUE TO KEEP PLO MODERATE.
SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 05223 02 OF 02 191147Z

AND TO SAVE ISRAEL'S FACE.

18. USG/PLO DIALOGUE.
SENATOR REPEATED HIS VIEW THAT IN OPINION OF THE CONGRESS IT IS NOT TENABLE FOR USG DEAL WITH PLO. NO US PRESIDENT COULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THIS. NEVERTHELESS, THE WORLD IS BIG, AND "WE ALL HAVE TO THINK OF SOME WAY".

19. SOVIETS IN MIDDLE EAST.
SENATOR, STRESSING HE BELIEVES US MILITARY FORCE IS SUPERIOR TO SOVIET AND THAT SOVIET SATELLITES ARE STONES AROUND MOSCOW'S NECK, NOTED THAT EGYPTIAN ABROGATION SOVIET TREATY CAN BE INSTRUCTIVE FOR US. HE ASKED WHY SADAT MADE DECISION, ESPECIALLY WHEN NO ALTERNATIVE WAS AVAILABLE. PRESIDENT REPLIED HE HAS DEALT

WITH SOVIETS FOR MORE THAN TEN YEARS. SOVIETS DO NOT WANT TO SOLVE ME PROBLEM, FOR AS LONG AS PROBLEM EXISTS EGYPT WILL RUN AFTER THEM FOR HELP. FURTHER, THEY ARE SUSPICIOUS BY NATURE AND SINCE OCTOBER 22 CEASE-FIRE, THEY HAVE PLAYED CAT-AND-MOUSE-- ONLY "IF I SHOUTED" DID THEY SEND SHIP WITH NON-VITAL SPARE PARTS (IN 1972, 15,000 TECHNICIANS WERE EXPELLED IN ONE WEEK AND ON APRIL 16, THE LAST FIVE SOVIET SHIPS LEFT ALECAANDRIA NAVAL FACILITIES DAY BEFORE DEADLINE). SOVIETS HAVE NOT RESUPPLIED EGYPT SINCE OCTOBER 22, EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD REPLACED SYRIA'S WAR LOSSES BEFORE OCTOBER 22, JUST AS US REPLACED ALL ISRAEL'S LOSSES AS WAR DEVELOPED. AS CONSEQUENCE, "I UNCOVERED THEM" BEFORE WHOLE WORLD, ESPECIALLY ARABS, TO SHOW WHAT SOVIETS REALLY ARE. FOR ONE MONTH, BRITISH HAVE BEEN WORK-

ING TO FILL GAP AND SPARE PART WILL COME FROM YUGOSLAVIA AND ROMANIA TO KEEP OUR ARMS IN ACTION. THIS HAD BEEN CALCULATED, BUT "TREMENDOUS" CHINESE RESPONSE HAD SURPRISED SADAT.

20. SADAT'S BLUEPRINT FOR FUTURE.

SENATOR JAVITS ASKED PRESIDENT WHAT HIS DREAM IS FOR EGYPT AND REGION, NOTING ECONOMIC FIGURES FOR ISRAEL AND EGYPT SHOW CONTINUING SITUATION IS IMPOSSIBLE. PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT 27 YEAR OF BELLIGERENCY ACCOUNT FOR ALL AREA'S SUFFERING. "SO WHY NOT ONCE AND FOR ALL END OFFICIALLY THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY", LET THE PALESTINIANS "START THEIR STATE", AND PROVIDE GUARNATEES FOR BOTH SIDES. FUARANTEES COULD COME FROM US, US-USSR, FIVE GREAT POWERS, SECRET

PAGE 04 CAIRO 05223 02 OF 02 191147Z

UNSC, OR SIMILAR SOURCES.

"IF THEY (ISRAEL) ASK YOU (US) FOR TREATY, I HAVE NO OBJECTION". BUT THERE MUST BE GUARANTEES FOR BOTH SIDES. I CANNOT FULFILL DREAM OF TAKING PLANE TO TEL AVIV; THIS IF FOR NEXT GENERATION TO DECIDE. WE, HOWEVER, CAN PAVE WAY. EGYPT HAS PROVED ITSELF; WE SAT WITH ISRAEL AT KILOMETER 101, IN GENEVA, AND ON SINAI JOINT COMMISSION-- SOME ARABS CALLED THIS TREASON, BUT EGYPT DID IT. RABIN " INSPECTED" LATELY THE AREA, VISITING E-1. SOME RAISED HELL IN ARAB WORLD, BUT I DON'T CARE. "EGYPTIANS NO LONGER HAVE THE ISRAELI COMPLEX".

21. REGIONAL ECONOMIC ARRANGEMENTS.

SENATOR NOTED THAT HE DREAMS THAT SOME DAY THERE MIGHT BE REGIONAL ECONOMIC ARRANGEMENTS SUCH AS FREE TRADE AREAS OR CUSTOMS UNION. PRESIDENT SAID HE CAN ONLY PAVE THE WAY. HE HIMSELF HAD MADE "100 PERCENT CHANGE" AFTER NASSAR DIED, BUT DOES NOT CONSIDER HE HAS BETRAYED HIM. NASSAR MADE TERRIBLE MISTAKE, FORGETTING BEN GURIION'S PLOY TO CREAT A RIFT BETWEEN EGYPT AND US (LAVON AFFAIR); EGYPT MUST HAVE THE BEST OF RELATIONS WITH US.

22.PRESIDENT ASKED SENATOR WHAT HE THOUGHT OF SADAT'S POSITION. SENATOR RESPONDED THAT HIS POSITION REQUIRES NECESSARY ELEMENTS FOR SECURITY. SADAT INTERJECTED " DEFENSE". SENATOR CONTINUED

THIS REQUIREMENT MUST BE TEMPERED BY EFFORTS TO DEFUSE SITUATION.
ISRAEL'S AND EGYPT'S SITUATION ARE DISSIMILAR IN DETAILS AND
SPECIFICS (E.G. SUPPLY FOR ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE), BUT
BASIC PRINCIPLE MUST BE THAT BOTH ARE SECURE.
EILTS

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 15 SEP 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 19 APR 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976CAIRO05223
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D760148-1106
From: CAIRO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t197604115/baaaerxu.tel
Line Count: 332
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION H
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 29 MAR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <29 MAR 2004 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <30 MAR 2004 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CODEL JAVITS: MEMCON--PRESIDENT SADAT/SENATOR JAVITS SUMMARY: SENATOR JAVITS HAD WIDE RANGING CORDIAL
TAGS: OREP, (JAVITS, JACOB)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006